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Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand
Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to
Refuse Treatment
Due process prohibits the trial of a criminal defendant who,
due to mental illness, is unfit to stand trial.1 To be fit, a defendant
must have "'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and. . . a ra-
tional as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.' "2 Antipsychotic drugs3 can be used to improve the cognitive
functioning of persons suffering from psychosis, 4 and persons who
would otherwise be unfit to stand trial have been held to meet the
fitness requirement when treated with antipsychotic drugs.' Al-
though these rulings have worked to the benefit of mentally ill de-
fendants wishing to go to trial under medication,6 they have also
' Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386
(1966); see infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. This comment will use the term "un-
fit" strictly in the sense of a legal inability to stand trial. "Incompetent," though often used
as a synonym in this context, will be used here to refer to the legal incapacity to care for
oneself. See infra note 110.
2 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting statement of the Solicitor
General).
3 Antipsychotic drugs, formerly known as "major tranquilizers," include such drugs as
Thorazine (chlorpromazine), Mellaril (thioridazine), Prolixin (fluphenazine), Haldol (halo-
peridol), and Stelazine (trifluoperazine). See 1 Drugs in Institutions: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 570-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Antipsychotic
drugs are a subcategory of a group of compounds known as psychotropic (mind affecting)
drugs. This group includes other therapeutic drugs, such as sedatives and ordinary tranquil-
izers, as well as psychedelic drugs, narcotics, and alcohol. See Klerman, Psychotropic Drugs
as Therapeutic Agents, in PSYCHIATRY AND ETHICS 430, 444 n.1 (R. Edwards ed. 1982);
Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 Ah. B. FoUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 769, 779. Thorazine, the prototypical antipsychotic drug, was introduced in 1952.
Klerman, supra, at 431.
See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987, 989 (D.V.I.), aff'd
mem., 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 461, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381
(1978); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 491, 553 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Ct. App. 1976); Ake v. State,
663 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ake v. Oklahoma,
105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985); Commonwealth v. Blair, 491 Pa. 499, 502, 421 A.2d 656, 657 (1980);
State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 671, 244 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1978).
6 See, e.g., State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 402, 218 So. 2d 311, 312 (1969) (fact that
remission of psychosis was due to antipsychotic drugs is of "no legal consequence"; court
should not "look beyond existing competency and erase improvement produced by medical
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been extended to situations in which the state seeks to bring to
trial defendants who do not wish to submit to drug treatment.'
By analyzing the question of forced administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs simply as a question of fitness, most courts ignore the
effect of the drugs on the defendant's ability to function as a de-
fendant. Defendants may object to going to trial under the influ-
ence of antipsychotic drugs because the drugs affect mood and
emotion as well as rational thought," often producing a trusting
and apathetic attitude that undercuts an effective defense. In addi-
tion, the defendant's demeanor in court may also work against him
by misleading the jury about his probable mental state at the time
of the crime or by prejudicing the jury against him.
This comment will show that, although the state has a strong
interest in bringing criminal defendants to trial, it should not be
permitted to compel defendants to go to trial by subjecting them
to medication that weakens their ability to assume the role of a
criminal defendant.9 A narrow focus on fitness obscures proper
consideration of the complete range of protections to which a crim-
inal defendant is entitled. It is not enough to note that the state
has, by forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, "given" the
defendant cognition; it is also necessary to examine whether the
state has by these same means "taken away" important qualities of
science"); People v. Dalfonso, 24 Ill. App. 3d 748, 749-50, 321 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1974) (fol-
lowing Hampton); State v. Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 108, 247 N.E.2d 342, 349 (C.P. 1969)
(defendant being voluntarily treated with antipsychotic drugs is fit to stand trial). A defen-
dant may wish to be tried while taking antipsychotic drugs out of a desire to prove his
innocence or a preference for a determinate jail sentence over indeterminate institutional
commitment.
7 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987 (D.V.I.), aff'd
mem., 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Parsons, 82 Misc. 2d 1090, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840
(Nassau County Ct. 1975); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v.
Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978); State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1977).
a See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 571-73 (describing adverse side effects); see
also infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
9 This issue was recently briefed for the Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087 (1985). See Brief for Petitioner, Ake v. Oklahoma (available Apr. 1, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file). Ake had been found fit to stand trial after having been treated
with Thorazine. In his brief to the Supreme Court, Ake called into question the fitness
ruling; he argued that the drug had rendered him unable and unwilling to assist his counsel
and had altered his demeanor so as to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. The brief
stressed his "subjective feeling of isolation and uninvolvement" and "zombie-like appear-
ance." Id. Because the Court reversed Ake's conviction on other grounds, it did not reach
the issue of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087, 1092 n.2 (1985). This comment argues that the focus of concern in this situation
should not be the technical fitness requirement but rather the constitutional guarantees of
confrontation and presence at trial. See infra notes 48-96 and accompanying text.
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mood, emotion, or affect, with the result that the defendant loses
his ability to participate fully in the trial through the exercise of
his procedural rights of confrontation and presence. This second
inquiry is necessary to limit the state's coercive power over crimi-
nal defendants so that these procedural rights are not vitiated by
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.10
The first part of the comment examines the ways in which the
courts have thus far handled the problem of forced administration
of antipsychotic drugs to unfit defendants and concludes that these
approaches have been too abstractly categorical and have failed to
'o Some authors have suggested that the mentally ill have an absolute constitutional
right to refuse treatment with psychotropic drugs. See Rhoden, The Right to Refuse
Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (1980) (right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs is based on constitutional right to privacy); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The
Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497 (right to mental au-
tonomy and bodily integrity). But cf. Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic
Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of An-
tipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 78 (1983) (argument for a constitutional
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs weakened by fact that no evidence indicates that anti-
psychotic drugs are "mind-altering" or "thought-controlling").
A few courts have also found a substantive constitutional right to refuse treatment. In
view of the direct and side effects of antipsychotic drugs, they have found a variety of inter-
ests that forced treatment may invade. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th
Cir. 1984) (liberty and first amendment interests outweigh state interest in forcible adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs to bring defendants to trial), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (the integrity of one's
"mental processes"); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.) (first amendment rights of
religious freedom preclude forcing a Christian Scientist to accept drug therapy absent life-
threatening emergency), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp.
915, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (substantive due process affords right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic drugs); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (cruel and
unusual punishment and right to privacy); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 748 n.8 (D.C. 1979)
(privacy interests, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and integrity of mental
processes, citing Mackey). Other courts have not been receptive to this line of argument and
have instead merely required a high degree of procedural due process protection prior to
forced treatment. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848-51 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc),
vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en
banc); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Rennie was remanded for further
consideration in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Youngberg, however,
addressed the right to receive-not the right to refuse-treatment. For this reason, at least
one court has held that the reasoning in Rennie about a qualified right to refuse treatment
was not affected by the Court's remand. Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026,
1031 n.1 (D.D.C. 1983). Rogers was remanded for further consideration in light of relevant
state-law developments. The Court did not say, however, that the Constitution itself was
not a sufficient source of protection. 457 U.S. at 300.
This comment neither asserts that there is an absolute right to refuse antipsychotic-
drug treatment nor examines the procedural requirements for forced administration of anti-
psychotic drugs; it instead examines the consequences of such treatment for a criminal
defense.
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address adequately the functional concerns presented by the con-
frontation and due process clauses. The second part of the com-
ment discusses the impact of antipsychotic drugs on the interests
protected by these constitutional provisions. Finally, the comment
proposes a new framework for resolving the problems raised by the
interplay between the fitness standard and the use of antipsychotic
drugs that may improve cognition while disabling the defendant in
other constitutionally significant ways.
I. ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE CASE LAW
Although there is sporadic evidence at common law of at-
tempts by prison apothecaries to administer folk remedies in-
tended to cure the insanity of defendants found unfit to stand
trial," the modern American case law concerning the use of anti-
psychotic drugs to make a criminal defendant fit begins with State
v. Hampton.12 In Hampton, an unfit defendant persuaded the
court to permit her to be tried while taking Thorazine for her
psychotic condition. A state sanity commission had found that
Hampton, while under treatment, had a present capacity to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings and assist in her defense, and
the court held that the fact that this capacity was produced by
antipsychotic medication was of "no legal consequence." 13 Thus,
Hampton established the proposition that the state had no interest
in preventing the trial of a defendant who could, by taking drugs,
meet the fitness test: the court "[would] not look beyond existing
competency and erase improvement produced by medical
science. "14
The logical connection between the Hampton holding and the
conclusion that the state may compel unfit defendants to take an-
tipsychotic drugs is not obvious. Hampton only affirmed that the
fitness standard is a test of current ability to function 15 and held
that the fact that Hampton was "only 'synthetically sane' ,,16 con-
stituted no fraud upon the court. From the fact that the state has
no interest in preventing treatment, it does not follow that the
state may compel treatment; yet the majority of courts that have
1 See, e.g., Rex v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 312 (1790) (refusal to take unspecified
"drugs" after being examined for fitness to plead).
12 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
" Id. at 403, 218 So. 2d at 312; accord People v. Dalfonso, 24 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750-51,
321 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1974).
Hampton, 253 La. at 403, 218 So. 2d at 312.
15 See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 454 (1967).
18 Hampton, 253 La. at 402, 218 So. 2d at 312 (quoting the trial judge).
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considered the issue since Hampton have reached precisely this
conclusion. 17 In doing so, they have lost sight of Hampton's em-
phasis on functioning and have instead relied upon categorical no-
tions of mental disease and drug action.
In State v. Hayes,'8 for .example, the court held that antipsy-
chotic drugs did not affect the "process or content" of the defen-
dant's thoughts, but rather "allow[ed] the cognitive part of the de-
fendant's brain, which ha[d] been altered by the mental disease, to
come back into play."' 9 Other courts have found that antipsychotic
drugs affect only the "emotional" and not the "cognitive"
processes20 and that the drugs allow "'the mind to operate as it
might were there not some organic or other type of illness affecting
the mind.' ,,21 Thus, psychoses are located in the "emotional" part
of the brain, and the "cognitive" function-by inference, the "true
mind"-is held to be untouched by the disorder.
For these courts, mental activity involves at least two discrete
functions-logical cognition and emotion-and any effect that an-
tipsychotic drugs might have on the latter is all to the benefit of a
criminal defendant.23 The courts suggest that if antipsychotic
drugs were shown to affect cognition, their use would be impermis-
sible.2 4 As long as their function seems to be only to suppress emo-
tion, however, the law's revulsion against state control over men's
minds2 5 is not invoked, since "emotion" is not a part of the pro-
17 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987 (D.V.I.), af'd
mem., 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Dalfonso, 24 IlM. App. 3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379
(1974); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244
S.E.2d 302 (1978); State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (all relying on
Hampton).
Is 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
19 Id. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1381 (defendant had been given Stelazine, Lithium, and
Valium).
20 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987, 989 (D.V.I.) (ad-
ministration of Thorazine), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975).
21 State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 492, 553 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting ex-
pert testimony on effects of Thorazine).
" Under this view, the term "mental illness" is actually a misnomer, since it is not the
"mind" but the emotions that are affected.
23 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 461, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1978) (antipsy-
chotic drugs have "a beneficial effect on the defendant's ability to function"); State v. Blair,
276 S.C. 644, 646, 282 S.E.2d 596, 597 (1981) (testimony of psychiatrist that drugs had a
"beneficial effect in assisting patients with problems ... to think logically").
24 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 461, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1978); State v.
Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 492, 553 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664,
672, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978).
21 Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.").
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tected "mind."
Thus, the courts have posed the constitutional issue as one of
mind control by the government, and they have defined the action
of antipsychotic drugs in such a way that the conclusion must be
that the mind is not controlled. But either the mind is, as Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe suggests, "continuous and inchoate, 2 6 or it
consists of the cognitive function alone, upon which emotion is,
during psychosis, an unwelcome burden. When the question is
framed as a choice between considering the mind as an integrated
whole from which no mental function is separable or, on the con-
trary, as an entity that can be broken down into such compart-
ments as cognition, memory, and emotion,2 7 most courts have cho-
sen the latter view. This has made it difficult to define the nature
of the defendant's rights and to identify their legal or constitu-
tional source. Nevertheless, at least two distinct approaches have
emerged from the cases.
The most common view is that a criminal defendant's right to
be free from state interference with his mental processes during
trial is a narrow one 28 and is only violated if the state-administered
medication has a detrimental effect on the defendant's cognitive
processes. The drugs must diminish the defendant's comprehen-
sion,29 memory,30 ability to communicate coherently and to confer
with counsel,31 or ability to "function in a. . .rational manner";32
26 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-5, at 899 (1978) ("The opera-
tions of the mind are continuous and inchoate, extending well beyond an individual's con-
scious control. Although the ongoing experiences of thought and feeling may theoretically be
fragmented into discrete processes, constitutional no less than common sense quickly reveals
the difficulty and disingenuousness of ignoring their inevitable interdependence.").
27 One inventory of categories of mental activity includes: cognition (intelligence), be-
havior (ability to perform daily skills), affect (emotional sensations such as anger, joy, and
resentment), sensation (awareness of stimuli), imagery (self-esteem), and the ability to en-
gage in interpersonal relationships. Young & Troiano, Patient Characteristics, in MUL-
TIMODAL HANDBOOK FOR A MENTAL HosPrrAL 17, 21-25 (L. Brunell & W. Young eds. 1982).
28 Some courts have located the source of this right in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, e.g., State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 493, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Ct. App.
1976), or in provisions of state constitutions, e.g., State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 767,
355 P.2d 323, 326-27 (1960). Others do not identify a source and apparently view the right
as judicially created. E.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983);
State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 462, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1978).
29 See, e.g., State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 492, 553 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Ct. App. 1976); Ake
v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28, 426 P.2d 872, 875
(1967); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 670, 244 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1978); Jones v. State, 71 Wis.
2d 750, 754-55, 238 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1976).
20 See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 29, 426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967).
21 See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 671, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978).
32 See, e.g., id.
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drug-induced alterations of the defendant's mood or emotions are
not considered. 3
Courts adopting this view assume that the fitness standard
covers all of the mental activity with which the Constitution is
concerned under a due process analysis. Since the fitness standard
is limited to cognition, they therefore hold that forced administra-
tion of drugs will violate the defendant's constitutional rights only
if it interferes with cognitive funtioning.3 4 Once fitness is achieved,
due process has been satisfied.3 5
At least one court, however, has defined the unfit defendant's
right more broadly. In State v. Maryott,3 6 the Court of Appeals of
Washington held that the defendant's right to "exclusive control of
his mental processes at the time of trial 3 7 was violated because he
was given medication that rendered him unnaturally "dull and list-
less" and "not. . . like himself" and "suspicious and uncommuni-
cative [so that he] refused to assist in his defense."38 The court
asserted that "the ability of a man on trial to freely use his mental
faculties" is a fundamental due process right.3 9 The protection
thus afforded the "mind" in Maryott was more extensive than the
protection afforded by other courts because it included the whole
range of the defendant's mental activity rather than being limited
solely to cognition.
The approaches taken by the courts so far have been unsatis-
factory. Their emphasis on "mind control" is fatally subject to def-
initional quibbles, so that the result a court reaches depends on
what it defines the mind to include. The functional approach of
Hampton has been ignored and with it the fact that the Constitu-
tion-in particular, the sixth amendment-affords criminal defen-
dants rights that directly concern the functioning of a criminal
trial.40 The issue of forced treatment of persons unfit to stand trial
33 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 461, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1978) (only consid-
ering effects on "the cognitive part of the defendant's brain").
31 See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28, 426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967) (if defendant
was, owing to medication, "deprived of his ability in the absence thereof to comprehend the
nature of the proceedings and to assist in his own defense," conviction will not stand).
' See, e.g., State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 491, 553 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Ct. App. 1976).
38 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971).
' Id. at 100, 492 P.2d at 241.
Id. at 97-98, 492 P.2d at 240.
' Id. at 100, 492 P.2d at 241-242.
,o Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) ("The Sixth Amendment includes
a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense .... Because the rights are
basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are part of the 'due process of law'
that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of
the States.").
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must be analyzed in terms of those sixth amendment rights,4
which are meant to assure a fair and error-free trial.
II. THE TRIAL PROCESS AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Due process prohibits the trial of a defendant who is not fit.42
The legal standard for fitness is a test of cognitive rationality,43
and, outside the context of forced drug administration, this test is
a reasonable measure of procedural fairness. The use of antipsy-
chotic drugs to produce fitness, however, raises other constitutional
problems that are not adequately addressed merely by safeguard-
ing a defendant's cognitive rationality. A drug that improves the
cognition of an unfit defendant while vitiating other aspects of his
mental state may make him less able to assume the role of a defen-
dant than he was before treatment. Because the fitness test is not
concerned with other mental processes that are important to the
ability of an accused to defend himself, it is an inadequate crite-
rion by which to measure a forcibly medicated defendant's ability
to participate in his trial.
Although formulations of the fitness test differ, two elements
predominate in most jurisdictions: (1) the present capacity to un-
derstand the nature of the proceedings, and (2) the capacity to as-
sist defense counsel.44 While these elements hardly form a precise
"' One court has taken a quite different approach by holding that an unfit pretrial de-
tainee had a first amendment right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985). Argu-
ing that the first amendment protection of communication of ideas "implies protection of
the capacity to produce ideas," the court held that forced administration of antipsychotic
drugs interfered with the detainee's right to think and communicate free of restraints. 744
F.2d at 1394. In dictum, the court indicated that its analysis would apply in the trial context
as well: "[A]lthough the state undoubtedly has an interest in bringing to trial those accused
of a crime, we question whether this interest could ever be deemed sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a criminal defendant's interest in not being forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs." Id. at 1395. The difficulty with Bee's first amendment analysis, however, is that it
would apply equally to civilly committed mental patients, in conflict with the approaches
taken by other circuits in such cases, where an absolute right to refuse drug treatment has
been rejected in favor of a high degree of procedural due process protection prior to treat-
ment. See supra note 10. Although the confrontation and due process interests of a criminal
defendant differ significantly from those of a civilly committed patient, it is difficult to see
why the first amendment interests should differ.
42 See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
4' See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (a defendant must have
"'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and ... a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him' ") (quoting statement of the Solicitor General); State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399,
403, 218 So. 2d 311, 312 (1969) (capacity to understand proceedings and assist in defense);
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standard, it can be stated generally that fitness requires only a cur-
rent capacity to comprehend and assist, not a lively intelligence or
an accurate memory of events.45
A previously unfit defendant who has been treated with anti-
psychotic drugs will usually meet the constitutional fitness require-
ment.46 This is not because the drugs are necessarily of net benefit
to him in making his defense, but rather because fitness is a mini-
mum cognitive standard that does not take account of the full
range of his mental activity. But the fitness test, as formulated by
the Supreme Court,47 does not imply that cognitive fitness is neces-
sarily to be pursued through means that alter or weaken other
processes in the mental spectrum, processes that may be important
to the ability of the accused to defend himself.
The coercive use of antipsychotic drugs to enable an unfit de-
State v. Buie, 297 N.C. 159, 161, 254 S.E.2d 26, 28 (capacity to comprehend position, under-
stand nature and object of proceedings, conduct defense in a rational manner, and cooperate
with counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-10 (1980 &
Supp. 1984) (ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist
in defense); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("No person
who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced. . . so long
as such incapacity endures.").
41 See, e.g., People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 435-36, 310 N.E.2d 292, 295, 354
N.Y.S.2d 609, 613-14 (1974) (rejecting amnesia as a basis for incompetence; statutory test is
whether defendant, "with a modicum of intelligence," can assist counsel); Note, supra note
15, at 459 ("The standard of rational understanding emphasized in Dusky must be taken to
mean no more than that the defendant be able to confer coherently with counsel and have
some appreciation of the significance of the proceeding and his involvement in it.").
4" Courts turn regularly to psychiatric experts for recommendations about fitness. See
HENRY STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 54
(1979) (asserting that judges "very rarely disagree" with psychiatric opinions). Psychiatrists
tend to define fitness, however, "'in terms of traditional diagnostic symptomology rather
than the defendant's capacity for courtroom functioning, equating incompetence with the
presence of psychosis.'" Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Re-
tarded Defendant: The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a Multi-Disciplinary
Problem, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 365, 377 (1981) (quoting Paythress & Stock, Competency to
Stand Trial: A Historical Review and Some New Data, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 134
(1980)). Medical skeptics point out that since it is lawyers and judges who define what a
trial is and what due process requires, a psychiatrist is not equipped to decide whether an
accused who displays certain psychotic symptoms can participate in a trial consistently with
due process. See LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, HARvARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, COM-
PETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS 20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPETENCY
TO STAND TRIAL]. Nevertheless, medical testimony about the effects of antipsychotic drugs
concurs on the point that cognitive ability is improved with treatment.
47 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (the test for fitness to stand
trial "'must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' ") (quoting statement of the
Solicitor General).
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fendant to meet the fitness standard raises two sorts of questions.
First, drugs that affect the emotions may inhibit the defendant's
ability to function properly as a defendant. Although a defendant
may have the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist his
counsel, other effects of the drugs (e.g., diminished anxiety, unnat-
ural apathy, and an increased level of trust of adversaries) may
diminish his motivation to advise his lawyer about the cross-exam-
ination of witnesses. Second, the defendant whose personality and
behavior during trial are altered by drug treatment is exposed to a
high possibility of unwarranted prejudice in the eyes of the trier of
fact. Even if it is not certain that there will be actual prejudice to
the defendant's ability to make his case, coercion is fundamentally
unfair where there is a reasonable possibility of prejudice.
A. The Confrontation Clause
The sixth amendment's guarantee of a defendant's right "to
be confronted with the witnesses against him"4 8 has been con-
strued to secure his right to be present at those stages of his trial
"where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his absence."4 9
The principal value served by the defendant's presence is his abil-
ity to give advice and suggestions to his counsel during the course
of the trial50 and to be sure that his attorney "presents a vigorous
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1935)); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) ("One of the most basic of
the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial.") (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892));
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222 (1952) (dictum) (in a "criminal trial where the
guilt of the defendant is in issue ... his presence is required by the Sixth Amendment").
50 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (right of presence based on pre-
mise that defendant is enabled to "give advice or suggestion" to his attorney); Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (noting that "one of the defendant's primary advantages of
being present at the trial" is "his ability to communicate with his counsel" and holding that
binding and gagging a criminal defendant at trial is not the fairest way to deal with a dis-
ruptive criminal defendant except in "some circumstances which we need not attempt to
foresee"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934) ("A defendant in a criminal case
must be present at a trial when evidence is offered, for the opportunity must be his to
advise with his counsel ... and cross-examine his accusers.") (citations omitted).
The Court in Snyder distinguished the privilege of presence, as found in the sixth
amendment, from the privilege of confrontation, acknowledging the exceptions that have
been made to the latter under established hearsay rules. 291 U.S. at 107. The Court made it
clear that the privilege of presence is personal to the defendant and is not discharged by the
ability of the defendant's counsel to participate: "[D]efense may be made easier if the ac-
cused is permitted to be present. . . to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his
lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself." Id. at 106.
The Court continues to rely on this formulation of the presence standard. In Faretta v.
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defense."'" Although cross-examination is normally conducted by
counsel, the defendant's recollections and suggestions during the
trial serve to aid counsel in carrying out that task.
The importance of the defendant's ability to participate ac-
tively in the conduct of his trial, free from state interference, is
illustrated in cases addressing the effective assistance of counsel.
In Geders v. United States, 52 for example, the trial judge had or-
dered the defendant not to speak to his attorney during an over-
night recess taken while the defendant was being cross-examined.
The Supreme Court held that any "coaching" of the witness could
be exposed by the prosecutor during cross-examination, and that
even if cross-examination was not wholly efficacious, the defen-
dant's right to consult with his attorney about trial strategy must,
under the sixth amendment, prevail over the government's concern
about coaching.53 In Ferguson v. Georgia,54 the Court struck down
a state law prohibiting defendants from testifying under oath and
allowing them only to make a statement to the jury without guid-
ing questions from counsel.55 The Court recognized that, under the
pressures of a trial, a defendant might be unable to give a proper
and complete statement without counsel's direction.5 6 Moreover, in
Faretta v. California,57 the Court held that the defendant's sixth
amendment interest in participating in the conduct of his trial was
so important that it could override the state's interest in requiring
that the defendant be represented by an attorney.58
The importance of the defendant's right to be present and
participate in the conduct of his trial requires that the right be
assured not only in form, but in effect as well. To be effectively
present, a defendant must be alert, concerned, and ready to assist
his counsel, not only when counsel asks for assistance, but when-
ever the defendant, of his own accord, sees the need to intervene.
Thus, he must have not only the cognitive capacity to assist his
California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975), the Court found a criminal defendant's right to re-
present himself to be implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment; it relied in part on
the rationale of Snyder in finding that the presence standard supported the right to self-
representation.
51 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 30, 98 (1970) (discussing Illinois
v. Allen).
5- 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
53 Id. at 91.
- 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
5 Id. at 596.
56 Id. at 594-95.
57 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
58 Id. at 832-34.
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counsel-to understand the proceedings and to respond meaning-
fully to questions-but also the desire and initiative to do so. A
defendant who is apathetic and distracted, whose defensive in-
stincts are not keen, and who unquestioningly accepts the state-
ments of the prosecution and the witnesses against him will not be
able to exercise his right of presence and cross-examination in an
effective manner.
Antipsychotic drugs produce precisely these sorts of attitudes
as a concomitant of their beneficial effect on cognition." Two com-
mon syndromes associated with antipsychotic drugs are akinesia
and akathisia, which are characterized, respectively, by apathy and
distraction.
Akinesia is "a behavioral state of diminished spontaneity char-
acterized by few gestures, unspontaneous speech, and particularly,
apathy and indifference toward initiating usual activities." 60 There
is "an attenuation of impulsivity, initiative, and motor activity."'"
The patient may be "apathetic, lacking in spontaneity, relatively
unable to participate in social activities, lifeless, zombie-like, or
drowsy" as a result.6 2 The government psychiatrist at the trial
phase of Dusky v. United States,6 3 for example, testified that
Thorazine would make his patient "less agitated, less concerned. It
might be he was so unconcerned he didn't particularly care what
he did. 6e4
It is often difficult to recognize the presence of akinesia be-
cause the patient often denies that he has any difficulty, while
59 JERROLD BERNSTEIN, HANDBOOK OF DRUG THERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 54 (1983) (side ef-
fects of antipsychotic drugs are for the most part "directly related to the pharmacology of
the drug and may indeed be an extension of some of the mechanisms responsible for the
therapeutic action of a given compound").
60 D. KLEIN, R. GITTELMAN, F. QUITKJN & A- RIFKIN, DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 199-203 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS];
Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, Akinesia: A Poorly Recognized Drug-Induced Extrapyramidal Be-
havioral Disorder, 32 ARcHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 672, 672 (1975).
61 Freyhan, Psychopharmacology and the Controversial Clinician, in DRUGS AND BE-
HAVIOR 184, 190 (L. Uhr & J. Miller eds. 1960).
'2 Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2257,
2281 (H. Kaplan, A. Freedman & B. Sadock eds. 1980).
63 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
'4 Quoted in COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
877 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY]; see also Gelman, Mental Health
Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEo. L.J. 1725, 1751 (1984) (antipsychotic
drugs "possess a remarkable potential for undermining individual will and self-direction,
thereby producing a psychological state of unusual receptiveness to the directions of
custodians").
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"seemingly locked in some peaceful apathetic remoteness."6 5 The
patient's disinclination to speak 6 and his indifference to stimuli,6 7
while perhaps beneficial from a psychiatric point of view, s are a
definite liability to an effective criminal defense. An apathetic de-
fendant who is disinclined to speak up during the give-and-take of
cross examination cannot be of much help in his own cause, espe-
cially if he does not even recognize his own disinclination.
Akathisia is characterized by "involuntary motor restlessness,
constant pacing, an inability to sit still, often accompanied by
fidgeting, chewing and lip movements, and finger and leg move-
ments. '69 While akathisia is often misdiagnosed as a symptom of
anxiety,70 it is in fact caused by the medication. The restlessness,
inability to sleep, and urge to pace caused by the medication, re-
sult in "states of frank agitation."' 71 Because the anxiety induced
by this restlessness is easily mistaken for underlying psychotic
anxiety, it is frequently mistreated by increasing the dosage of the
antipsychotic medication.7 2 Akathisia may be treated with an-
" Van Putten, May & Wilkins, Importance of Akinesia: Plasma Chlorpromazine and
Prolactin Levels, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1446, 1446 (1980).
46 Van Putten & May, 'Akinetic Depression' in Schizophrenia, 35 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSY-
CHIATRY 1101, 1101 (1978).
67 Winkehnan, A Long-Term Investigation of Chlorpromazine, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
865, 866 (1960).
48 LAWRENCE KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 624 (8th ed. 1973) ("If the patient
responds well to [Thorazine], he develops an attitude of indifference both to his surround-
ings and to his symptoms."); Barahona-Fernandes, Cazullo, Cocchi, Denber, Freyhan,
Klerman, K6knel, Levine, Saarma, Sarteschi, Vinar & Wittenborn, Therapeutic Problems, 5
MODERN PROBLEMS OF PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY 148, 152 (1970) ("the drugs really treat the con-
dition in such a way that the devil still speaks to our patients, but they do not care much
about it").
69 PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, supra note 60, at 175.
70 Id.
71 Freyhan, supra note 61, at 191. One prisoner who was given Prolixin gave the follow-
ing account-
There is no other feeling like it. Nothing to relate it to, no experience anyone
would normally go through in their life. It affects you mentally and physically and you
feel suicidal. The physical effects are so bad you can't stand it. You get muscle spasms,
predominantly in the legs, but also in all other parts of your body including the facial
muscles. You get lockjaw; you can't control your tongue; you get leg cramps. You get so
tired (as if you've been up three days in a row) you lie down. But you can't stay down
for more than three or four minutes because your knees begin to ache, an itching type
ache.
Your thoughts are broken, incoherent; you can't hold a train of thought for even a
minute. You're talking about one subject and suddenly you're talking about another.
Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: A Review of the Research, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 37, 41
(1977).
72 Ross BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 44 (1977).
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tiparkinsonian drugs, but many cases respond poorly."3
The patient experiencing akathisia "is so beset by motor rest-
lessness that he cannot concentrate, but is driven about rest-
lessly. 7 14 The emotional apathy and lack of genuine initiative
symptomatic of akinesia, combined with the physical restlessness
and the distraction symptomatic of akathisia, produces a defen-
dant who, though he is cognitively aware of his circumstances and
can respond to questions lucidly, is not likely to help himself and
his attorney during the trial.
The benefits of any therapy are contextual. 5 Medication that
is beneficial to a patient in an institutional setting, because it is
soothing and facilitates a trusting doctor-patient relationship,76 is
not similarly beneficial in a courtroom, where the apathy and plia-
bility induced by the drugs can have detrimental consequences.
Even if a doctor concludes that a course of treatment will make a
patient fit to stand trial, medical opinion cannot be dispositive of
the legal question of whether an accused can participate in a trial
consistently with due process or confrontation. 7
7 Id.
74 PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, supra note 60, at 175.
75 It is necessary to classify a drug as "therapeutic" or "toxic" with reference to the
setting in which the patient is placed. Cole, Behavioral Toxicity, in DRUGS AND BEHAVIOR
166, 178 (L. Uhr & J. Miller eds. 1960).
76 Id. at 173.
7' Cf. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRiAL, supra note 46, at 20 (fitness a legal, not a psychiat-
ric, issue).
Of course, some defendants are naturally listless and apathetic, and it would be unreal-
istic for the confrontation clause to require all defendants affirmatively to demonstrate a
lively interest in their trials. The critical distinction in this context is the element of state
action in coercing the disability. A useful analogy can be drawn to the right-to-counsel cases.
Some attorneys are simply incompetent at the task of managing a defense, and the func-
tional concerns that lie behind the sixth amendment guarantees have led the Supreme
Court to hold that, in extreme cases, actual attorney ineffectiveness results in such prejudice
that there must be a new trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-68
(1984) (discussing standard of review for "actual ineffectiveness" of counsel); see generally
Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial
Guarantee, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 1380 (1983) (arguing for a distinction between the sixth
amendment right to counsel and the due process right to a reliable verdict). The Supreme
Court has, however, distinguished natural attorney ineffectiveness from ineffectiveness
caused by government action. Where attorney ineffectiveness is caused by government ac-
tion, the Court has developed a per se rule of reversal without the need to show actual
prejudice. For example, where the state prevents the client from talking to his attorney
during a recess, see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text, or prevents the attorney from eliciting the defendant's unsworn testi-
mony through questioning, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961); supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text, or prevents the attorney from summing-up the evidence to
the judge at a bench trial, see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864 (1975), the Court has
not looked for actual prejudice but has applied a prophylactic rule of reversal. Such direct
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B. Due Process Considerations
An accused is also guaranteed the right to be present in the
court during his trial by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,7 8 a right that protects interests other than the oppor-
tunity for participation in the presentation of evidence. Presence
helps to ensure that the defendant is properly identified by wit-
nesses79 and may also help to "sift[] the conscience of the wit-
ness."80 Moreover, it may be advantageous to the defendant to ap-
pear personally, since his presence allows the jury to form an
opinion of him:8' it may be easier to convict an absentee than a
real person in the courtroom.
The potentially prejudicial effect of the defendant's altered
appearance and demeanor attributable to antipsychotic drugs, like
the alteration of his keenness to participate in the trial, is subject
to variation from case to case. Antipsychotic drugs may produce a
markedly passive and apathetic or "zombie-like" appearance as a
result of suppressed emotionalism. Antipsychotic drugs may also
cause profuse sweating, muscular tics, difficulty in swallowing, a
shuffling gait, and an extremely disquieting tendency toward spas-
modic eye-rolling and neck-twisting.8 3 These effects are of special
concern to criminal defendants to the extent that altered appear-
interference with the effective assistance of counsel is easily corrected by categorical rules
because the point of interference, in contrast with cases of natural ineffectiveness in a gen-
eral sense, is easy to identify. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 201 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Leventhal, J.). Further, where the state is directly
responsible, the interference is easy to prevent. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067; accord
United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046-47 & n. 25 (1984).
The same rationale applies to defendant ineffectiveness produced by forced treatment
with antipsychotic drugs. An ex post test of actual prejudice is inappropriate where the state
interference-forced drug administration-is direct and easily prevented. The intrusion can
readily be remedied by a prophylactic rule prohibiting forced treatment with apathy-induc-
ing drugs.
7'8 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578-79
(1884).
79 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE 413 (London 1827).
8' Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). There was, at common law, a
notion that a witness would be less likely to lie if forced to confront the defendant face-to-
face. For an example of such a procedure, see Samuel Atkins' Account of his Examination
before the Committee of Lords, appointed to examine the Murder of Sir Edmundbury God-
frey, 6 How. St. Tr. 1473, 1481 (1678).
"' Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("'It would be contrary to the dic-
tates of humanity to let [the defendant] waive the advantage which a view of his sad plight
might give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his defence with indul-
gence.'") (quoting Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103, 104 (1851)).
82 Davis, supra note 62, at 2281.
83 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 571; see also Davis, supra note 62, at 2280;
Winick, supra note 3, at 782 n.66.
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ance, idiosyncratic movements, drowsiness, and unnatural rigidity
may have a distracting or misleading effect on the trier of fact.
8 4
They may also have an effect on witnesses: if a witness might be
tempted to lie about an absent defendant, he might also be
tempted to lie about an unusually placid or distant one.
There is little doubt that the defendant's demeanor at trial
may play an important, perhaps crucial, role in the outcome of the
proceeding. In State v. Murphy,85 for example, the Supreme Court
of Washington ordered a new trial for a defendant who had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury because he
had taken tranquilizers prior to giving testimony. Although the
court did not doubt that the conviction was supported by the evi-
dence, it held that the demeanor of the defendant during his testi-
mony, which was "casual, cool [and] somewhat lackadaisical," '86
may have had a prejudicial influence upon the jury's decision to
order the death penalty.87 The antipsychotic drugs may have made
the defendant seem less remorseful and more calculating than he
would otherwise have appeared.
The prejudicial effect of an unusually calm demeanor is of
greatest concern when the defendant presents the defense of in-
sanity. 8 Here, the link between the defendant's appearance at trial
and his mental state at the time the crime was committed, though
legally irrelevant, may be difficult for the finder of fact to ignore. 9
It may be quite difficult for a jury to look past the emotionless and
rational defendant in court and see the serious psychosis from
which he suffers. In addition, it may be difficult for a jury to credit
the seriousness of a psychosis that can be "cured" by a relatively
brief course of treatment with drugs that are considered not to af-
fect "significant" mental processes. One psychiatrist who testified
on behalf of a defendant appeared to recognize this problem.
When asked whether the defendant was better able to assist his
attorney while taking antipsychotic drugs, the doctor observed:
"This I cannot answer directly because maybe his attorney's de-
Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1976) (due to potential for prejudice in
the eyes of the jury, state may not force defendant to wear prison clothing at trial).
85 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960).
86 Id. at 766, 335 P.2d at 326.
87 Id. at 767-68, 335 P.2d at 327.
88 See State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 462, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (1978).
89 See State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101-02, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971); see also In
re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 256-57, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975) ("Since depression played a large part
in the claimed insanity defense, an appearance of the defendant at trial that supported that
condition might be viewed as helpful.").
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fense would be better when he is at his worst."90
It has been suggested that any potential prejudice can be
counteracted by proper instructions to the jury,91 or, perhaps, by
allowing the jury to have a look at the defendant while he is taken
off the drugs for a short time during the trial.9 2 It has also been
suggested that excerpts from videotaped interviews with the defen-
dant, taken prior to drug treatment, can be shown to the jury to
establish a "base line" of the defendant's appearance and de-
meanor.9 3 But to treat these concerns as purely evidentiary ignores
the adversary context in which they occur.
The element of compulsion cripples the adversary system
whenever there is a risk of prejudice. For example, when a defen-
dant appears at his trial in prison clothing, the jury may or may
not tend to be prejudiced against him. Where such prejudice is
possible, however, the Court has held that the state cannot compel
a defendant to wear such attire. In a sense, a defendant in stripes
presents a different persona to the jury than a defendant in a busi-
ness suit. The same is true of treatment with antipsychotic drugs.9 5
It may be that in some cases the drugged defendant's altered de-
meanor would have no prejudicial effect on the jury. But the point
of the prison-garb decision is that the state may not coerce the
defendant into a position of even potential prejudice.96
90 Quoted in MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 64, at 876.
" See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 671-72, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306-07 (1978).
See In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975).
' See MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 64, at 904.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1976); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344
(1970) (preferring removal from court to binding and gagging of disruptive defendant, in
part because "the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's
feelings about the defendant").
" [T]he interest of society in bringing an accused person to trial, and the interest of
the defendant in having an opportunity to establish his innocence, cannot justify the
risk that a man will be sent to his death because the side effects of the drugs that are
being administered to him without his consent have made the jury believe that he has
no interest in his case, no remorse for his crime, and, perhaps, is a "zombie" without a
soul.
Brief for Petitioner, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) (available Apr. 1, 1985, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
"6 The defendant's right to be present is not absolute. Like most procedural trial
rights, it may be voluntarily waived. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934)
(dictum); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455-59 (1912); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (dictum) (citing Snyder and Diaz); cf. Taylor v. United States, 414
U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure allowing voluntary waiver of defendant's right to be present). The defendant may
also forfeit the right to be present by behaving in a manner that is "so disorderly, disrup-
tive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the court-
room." Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. It cannot be said, however, that refusal to take antipsychotic
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
III. THE NEED TO ANALYZE COGNITION SEPARATELY FROM
EMOTION
One possible means of protecting a psychotic defendant's trial
rights in the context of forced administration of antipsychotic
drugs would be to alter the fitness standard itself. Thus, rather
than focusing solely on the existence of a minimum level of cogni-
tive ability, the standard for fitness to stand trial might incorpo-
rate a requirement that other mental processes be restored as well
before a defendant could be brought to trial. Such a solution would
be unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons: (1) fitness is capable of
use as a sword as well as a shield, and a broadened test would
allow too much room for prosecutorial manipulation; and (2) a
broader standard would be inapplicable to, or undesirable for, the
broad run of cases in which antipsychotic drugs are administered
with the patient's consent.
Although the Supreme Court has held, in Pate v. Robinson,97
that the conviction of an unfit defendant violates due process,98 the
rationale for the fitness requirement is not wholly clear. One com-
mentator suggests that its purposes are to safeguard the accuracy
of the trial proceeding, to ensure a fair trial, to preserve the "integ-
rity and dignity" of the legal process, and to ensure that a con-
victed defendant knows why he is being punished.99 Although some
courts have analyzed fitness as a privilege of the defendant, which
may be waived, 100 Pate's due process analysis does not appear to
drugs is either a voluntary waiver or a forfeiture. Voluntary waiver of fundamental trial
rights is not lightly presumed but is properly judged by the "intelligent and competent"
standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). A defendant who refuses to take
drugs and is not forced to take them cannot be tried in any event because he is not fit. And
if refusal were interpreted as a voluntary waiver that allowed the state forcibly to treat the
defendant with drugs, any notion of voluntariness becomes pure fiction.
97 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
98 Id. at 385.
99 MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 64, at 888-89.
100 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 462-63, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978); see also
People v. Tilson, 108 IlM. App. 3d 973, 977-78, 439 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (1982) (defendant who
does not raise the issue of fitness until after his conviction deemed to have waived issue).
But see Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 349, 402 A.2d 995, 997 (1979) (waiver rules
not applicable to fitness issue); cf. Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966)
(had he been informed of his client's mental incapacity, attorney would have concealed un-
fitness of his client because he felt that a sentence of 10 years in jail was preferable to a life
term in a state mental hospital); Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Con-
ceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHL L. REv. 21, 29-31 (1977) (suggesting that it
is improper for defense counsel to avoid raising fitness issue for tactical reasons; he cannot
make the decision to plead without his client's knowing and intelligent participation, and it
would be improper for the attorney to waive fitness when the defendant cannot meaning-
fully assert his own choice).
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support this approach. In Pate, the Court held that "it is contra-
dictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet
knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court deter-
mine his capacity to stand trial."''
If the requirement of fitness is not a privilege of the defen-
dant, neither is it an unmixed benefit to him. 0 2 Indeed, it appears
that the prosecution, in order to buy time or to effect the institu-
tionalization of an otherwise bailable accused, may raise the issue
of fitness even when the defendant expressly wishes not to do so.' 03
Crowded dockets and the expense of criminal trials may encourage
prosecutors (and judges) to seek diversion of the defendant from
the criminal-justice to the mental-health system. 04 Delay or diver-
sion to a mental hospital may, in any given case, benefit the prose-
cution or the defense-or both. 0 5
Thus, it should not be assumed that a defendant is automati-
cally better off being found unfit to stand trial than being tried.
The early litigation over fitness produced by antipsychotic drugs
was instigated by defendants who preferred a trial to indefinite
commitment. 06 Commitment is not necessarily less stigmatizing or
arduous than prison; indeed, it may be considerably more so.' 07
While open-ended unfitness commitments are no longer permit-
ted,10 8 the tendency of the courts to stretch civil commitment stat-
-- 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (citing Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16, 23 (8th Cir.
1960)).
102 See Note, supra note 15, at 455 ("The broadened standard of incompetency and the
power to determine the issue over a defendant's objection have enabled courts to impose
upon a defendant the consequences of the often unrealistic assumption that an incompe-
tency commitment will be less onerous than subjection to the criminal process.").
,03 See State v. Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 101, 247 N.E.2d 342, 344 (C.P. 1969) (prosecu-
tion may raise issue of fitness over objection of defense counsel); see also H. STEADMAN,
supra note 46, at 16 (incompetency detention allows defendant to be kept in custody while
prosecutor prepares his case "for more effective prosecution").
I" See ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 199 (1976).
105 Dr. Thomas Szasz observes that the issue of fitness has become merely a "strategic
ploy" in the criminal process. THOMAS SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 32 (1965). For this reason,
he and Professors Robert Burt and Norval Morris have proposed abolition of the fitness
requirement. See id. at 35-36; Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompe-
tency Plea, 40 U. CHL L. REv. 66 (1972). Sensible as the proposal may be, however, it ap-
pears to face considerable constitutional obstacles under the Supreme Court's decisions in
Pate and Dusky.
100 See, e.g., State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
107 Note, supra note 15, at 456; see also Winick, supra note 3, at 791 (hospitals to
which unfit defendants are committed typically "are little more than grim storehouses in
which treatment is grossly inadequate").
,08 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Court held that the
state cannot hold an unfit defendant "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain [fitness] in the fore-
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utes to allow long-term custody of unfit defendants is almost irre-
sistible. 09 The unfit defendant is therefore faced with a dilemma:
he can take antipsychotic drugs and undertake the risks of an un-
fair and inaccurate verdict, or he can refuse to take the drugs and
risk retributive civil commitment. Under the circumstances, it can-
not be assumed that the decision to refuse treatment will be made
seeable future." Id. at 738. If there is no progress toward fitness, the state must either insti-
tute ordinary civil commitment proceedings or, if the defendant is not thus committable, let
him go free. Id.
Under Jackson, an unfit defendant who is permitted to refuse antipsychotic drugs may
effectively block his attainment of fitness. As civil commitment is not always available, re-
fusal to take drugs may result in the defendant's release. Professor Winick asserts that "an
increasing number of incompetent defendants, particularly those with serious felony charges
facing lengthy terms of imprisonment, find it strategically beneficial to be deemed perma-
nently incapacitated so as to gain the 'benefits' of Jackson." Winick, supra note 3, at 792.
Another observer has noted that "mental illness, once a weapon against the defendant,
might become an impediment to the prosecution ... .But in the end malingering may
simply be a cost that reform must pay." A. SToNE, supra note 104, at 215.
Such fears are not wholly justified. One state response to Jackson has been the dis-
charge hearing, or "innocent-only trial," at which an unfit defendant may be acquitted of
his charge but not convicted. See, e.g., ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-25 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
Under such a system, if the state sustains its burden of proof of the charge, the treatment
period may be extended for a specified length of time. See id. § 104-25(d)(1)-(2). The maxi-
mum commitment period under this statute is five years, but in no case may the treatment
period exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the given crime.
In any event, it would be anomalous if Jackson, which was intended to expand the
protection against indeterminate pre-trial detention, were read to contract the protection
against unwanted mental interference. Though Jackson suggests that effective compulsory
treatment is a rational purpose for the commitment of an unfit defendant, 406 U.S. at 738,
this need not be read to imply that the unfit defendant must receive antipsychotic drugs in
particular. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the Court had antipsychotic drugs in mind, since
it took a dim view of the ability of "most of our mental institutions" to cope with unfitness.
Id. at 735. The key point of the case was that the state provided no therapy at all to Mr.
Jackson, whether he wanted it or not.
The state may, under certain circumstances, have a duty to provide treatment, but this
does not cancel the unfit defendant's right to refuse treatment. See In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d
747, 749 (Okla. 1980) (patient has an absolute right to meaningful treatment and also a
contrary right to refuse treatment). In Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio
1980), a class action filed by the inmates of a state mental hospital, the court argued that
neither the State's obligation to provide treatment, its interest in caring for its citi-
zens, its interest in protecting the safety of its charges, nor any other of its legitimate
interests justifies the State's administration of psychotropic drugs absent the informed
consent of the competent patient unless the patient presents a danger to himself or
others in the institution.
Id. at 938 (emphasis added). To say that Jackson mandates forcible treatment with antipsy-
chotic drugs is to say that psychotic defendants, by virtue of having been accused of a crime,
must lose confrontation and due process rights that could not be denied to healthy
defendants.
109 Burt & Morris, supra note 105, at 71 ("If state officials cannot bring to trial an
[unfit] person whom they believe to be a criminal, and cannot hold him simply because he is
[unfit], it is far from unlikely that the civil commitment statute will be stretched to fit his
case."); see infra note 110.
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lightly.
A better approach would be to permit defendants to waive
their rights under the confrontation and due process clauses if they
desire to take antipsychotic drugs. The attitudinal effects of anti-
psychotic drugs are less relevant at the waiver stage because a de-
fendant whose rational capacity has been restored by limited vol-
untary pre-trial treatment can respond to the questions and
options posed by his counsel, family, and doctor in a non-adver-
sarial, unhurried setting-a setting where the focus is on eliciting a
knowing and intelligent statement from the defendant, not on the
defendant's involvement in the give-and-take of an actual trial.110
"' The recognition of the psychotic defendant's right not to be forcibly gifen antipsy-
chotic drugs in order to bring him to trial may also require some restrictions on the state's
ability to assume guardianship over incompetent defendants. Some unfit defendants may
have disorders that are so serious that they either cannot care for themselves or present a
danger to others. If an individual has been adjudicated a civil incompetent, the state may
assume guardianship over the individual either under the police power, "to protect the com-
munity from the dangerous tendencies of [the] mentally ill," Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979), or under the parens patriae power, the state's prerogative to act as "'gen-
eral guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics,"' Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
257 (1972) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
When a criminal defendant is both unfit to stand trial and civilly incompetent, a con-
flict of interest arises between the state's role as guardian and its role as prosecutor. The
state's duty to do what is in the best medical interest of the unfit defendant may result in a
relaxed view of his legal interests, to the benefit of the prosecution. Cf. Weissbourd, Invol-
untary Commitment: The Move Toward Dangerousness, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 83, 95 (1982)
(premise that individual will benefit from parens patriae commitment often false). The unfit
defendant's right not go to trial while involuntarily under the influence of antipsychotic
drugs could become meaningless if the state could, under its parens patriae power, provide
the defendant's "consent" to treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Parens patriae decisions
are usually left to medical professionals, who are more qualified than judges or juries to
determine what is appropriate to the health needs of their patients, see Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982), but who know little about what is in the patient's best legal
interest, see Klerman & Schechter, Ethical Aspects of Drug Treatment, in PSYCHIATRIC
ETHICS 117, 121 (S. Bloch & P. Chodoff eds. 1981) ("The way is paved for patients to 'rot
with their rights on.' ") (quoting Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal, Invol-
untary Medication, and "Rotting with Your Rights On", 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 327-28
(1980)).
What may be needed is some means by which adversary interests of an incompetent
defendant who is unfit to stand trial can be asserted consistently with those of a competent
defendant who is unfit to stand trial. One possible means is the "substituted judgment"
approach adopted by some courts, under which a court attempts to determine the course of
action the incompetent would have chosen if competent. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d
650, 661 (1st Cir. 1980) (the parens patriae power must be asserted "with the aim of making
treatment decisions as the individual himself would were he competent to do so"), vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); In re Boyd,
403 A.2d 744, 749-51 (D.C. 1979). An incompetent would not always "choose" to be medi-
cated. Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 370
N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977) ("To presume that the incompetent person must always be subjected
to what many rational and intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the
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If the defendant decides to go to trial while taking antipsychotic
drugs, his counsel should inform the trial judge of this fact so that
the judge can determine on the record that the waiver is knowing
and voluntary, much as he would a plea of guilty or a waiver of
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Because the standard of fitness to stand trial is necessarily one
of minimal cognitive ability, there is ample reason to find that a
defendant taking antipsychotic drugs is fit to stand trial. Subject
to a properly protective standard of waiver, it is proper to allow
defendants voluntarily to take these drugs in order to stand trial.
A different analysis, however, is appropriate where a defen-
dant refuses to consent to administration of the drugs. Antipsy-
chotic drugs may affect the defendant's ability to make his de-
fense, and the element of coerced alteration of mental condition
(involving apathy, distractedness, and the tendency to trust one's
adversaries) is not compatible with protection of the defendant's
constitutional rights under the confrontation and due process
clauses. Although the Constitution permits some interference with
the defendant's physical liberty both before and during trial, it
does not permit forcible interference by the state with core ele-
ments of the defendant's ability to conduct his defense.
Steve Tomashefsky
incompetent person ... "). Under such an approach, the court, rather than second-guess-
ing the medical practitioners, would step into the shoes of the incompetent. While perfect
"substitution" might never be possible, consideration of the views of family, legal counsel,
and medical advisors might serve to protect the defendant from a unilateral decision by the
state that might otherwise be based too heavily on the state's interests.
